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Abstract
Operational events in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) almost always result in a
disturbance of the regular ﬂow of payments. The author explores the link between payment ﬂows
and the overnight interest rate. She also explores the way that payments system frictions affect the
overnight interest rate. Payments system frictions arise because LVTS participants lack full
information on their own payment ﬂows and those of others. This uncertainty diminishes as the
ﬁnal end-of-day settlement nears. By borrowing earlier in the day in the overnight market,
however, participants can insure against being short at the ﬁnal end-of-day settlement. The author
ﬁrst develops a general framework describing the role that payment ﬂows and payments system
frictions have on the overnight rate and then empirically tests the implications of this model. She
ﬁnds that LVTS payment ﬂows are an important determinant of pressure on the overnight interest
rate.
JEL classiﬁcation: E5
Bank classiﬁcation: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Monetary policy implementation
Résumé
Les incidents d’ordre opérationnel qui surviennent au sein du Système de transfert de paiements
de grande valeur (STPGV) perturbent presque toujours le ﬂux régulier des paiements. L’auteure
étudie le lien entre les ﬂux de paiement et le taux du ﬁnancement à un jour. Elle s’intéresse
particulièrement à la façon dont les frictions du système de paiement inﬂuent sur ce taux. Les
frictions naissent du fait que les participants au STPGV ne disposent pas d’une information
complète sur leurs propres paiements ni ceux de leurs homologues. Cette incertitude diminue à
mesure qu’approche le règlement ﬁnal, à la ﬁn de la journée. Les participants ont toutefois la
possibilité d’emprunter plus tôt dans la journée, sur le marché à un jour, pour éviter d’être en
défaut lors du règlement ﬁnal. L’auteure établit un cadre général qui décrit l’incidence que les ﬂux
de paiement et les frictions du système de paiement ont sur le taux du ﬁnancement à un jour, puis
teste empiriquement les implications de son modèle. Elle constate que les ﬂux de paiement du
STPGV sont une source importante de pression sur le taux du ﬁnancement à un jour.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E5
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement;
Mise en œuvre de la politique monétaire  1 
1.  Introduction 
Operational events in a payments system almost always result in a disturbance of  the 
regular flow of payments. This paper explores the extent to which changes in payment 
flows have the potential to affect the overnight interest rate. 
 
  The overnight interest rate is the interest rate at which funds are borrowed or lent 
for a term of one business day, the shortest term to maturity in the money market. The 
Bank of Canada sets the target overnight rate, which is its key monetary policy (MP) 
tool. T he  actual  overnight  rate is determined by  the  relative demand and supply 
conditions in the overnight (ON) market. A measure of the deviation of the actual ON 
rate from the target ON rate provides us with a corresponding measure of the efficiency 
of monetary policy implementation. The closer is the actual ON rate to the target, the 
more efficient is the monetary policy implementation.
1  
 
  The first step in the transmission of MP takes place within the payments system, 
or more specifically, through the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Changes in the 
target  ON rate  immediately  affect  the lending and deposit rate charged to  LVTS 
participants and then, through their overnight market participation, the actual ON rate. 
Efficient MP implementation necessitates a close integration between the LVTS and the 
overnight market; the link lies in the fact that LVTS participants’ borrowing and lending 
activity in the overnight market is influenced by their LVTS payment flows. This paper 
explores the effect that payment flows and payments system frictions have on the 
efficiency of MP implementation. Payments system frictions arise because LVTS 
participants lack full information on their own payment flows and those of others. This 
uncertainty diminishes as the final end-of-day settlement nears. By borrowing earlier in 
the day in the overnight market, however, participants can insure against being short at 
final end-of-day settlement. This paper develops a general framework describing the role 
that payment flows and payments system frictions,  in the form of  information 
                                                 
1 A measure of monetary policy efficiency, according to Blix, Daltung, and Heikensten (2003), is the 
closeness of inflation outcomes to the target. The measure of monetary policy implementation efficiency 
proposed in this paper is based on the same principle.    2 
asymmetries,  have on the ON rate.  Empirical tests  demonstrate  that higher  LVTS 
payment volume creates upward pressure on the ON rate. In the more recent period, a 
significant improvement  is observed  in the efficiency of MP implementation. 
Nevertheless, LVTS payment flows remain an important determinant of the pressure on 
the ON rate.  
 
  This study appears to be one of the first in-depth analyses of the ON rate as it 
relates to the LVTS and monetary policy implementation. Examples of some descriptive 
and informative work on the topic include Clinton (1997), Howard (1998), and Dingle 
(1998). The literature  is sparse, partly because  Canada has a unique monetary policy 
implementation mechanism. In most countries, financial market players are subjected to 
specified reserve requirements and monetary policy is implemented by controlling the 
supply of  reserve  funds. For example, Ho and Saunders (1985) and Hamilton (1996) 
provide models of the federal funds rate behaviour in the United States, which is closely 
related to the demand for reserve requirements of financial institutions. Furfine (2000) 
introduces interbank flows into the model as an additional determinant of the demand for 
federal funds. Moschitz (2004) finds that the volatility of the euro area overnight rate is 
closely related to the open market operations in a reserve  maintenance period. 
Unfortunately, the results of these and related studies cannot be applied to Canada.  
 
  Section 2 provides a brief  overview of the MP implementation  mechanism in 
Canada. Section 3 introduces the general framework and the model. Section 4 describes 
LVTS payment flows and MP variables of interest. The implications of the model are 
empirically tested in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Overview of the MP Implementation Mechanism 
The LVTS is an electronic payments system that enables member financial institutions to 
send and receive payments  that are immediately final (i.e.,  unconditional and 
irrevocable). Currently, there are 15 LVTS participants, including the Bank of Canada.  
   3 
  The Bank of Canada implements MP through the use of its standing facilities in 
the LVTS.
2  A c hange  in the target ON rate  immediately affects LVTS participants 
through both the interest rate paid on any surplus settlement balances held overnight at 
the Bank of Canada and the interest rate charged on any shortfall in participants’ end-of-
day  settlement  balances. LVTS participants’ settlement balances will vary  each day, 
depending on their payment flows and their liquidity management practices. The rate that 
the Bank of Canada pays participants on their surplus settlement balances is 25 basis 
points lower than the target ON rate, while shortfalls in end-of-day balances must be 
offset by taking a fully collateralized advance from the Bank of Canada at an interest rate 
that is 25 basis points above the target ON rate. The resulting 50 basis point spread 
between lending and deposit rates is known as the “operating band” and encourages 
participants to borrow from and lend to each other at rates that fall close to the midpoint 
of that range. They have the opportunity to do that half an hour before the end of the 
LVTS daily cycle, which is known as  the pre-settlement period.  During this time, 
participants search for trading partners and negotiate the terms of the loan, usually over 
the phone, lacking the information on the exact net positions of others. Lack of perfect 
information on the net positions of others creates market frictions and increases 
transactions costs associated with matching lenders and borrowers. However, the rates 
charged during the pre-settlement period do not enter the official ON rate calculations.  
   
  The actual ON rate is determined by the relative demand and supply conditions in 
the overnight market, where  LVTS participants are active  players. The market  also 
includes  a broad range of other financial market players such as  banks, investment 
dealers, corporations, investment funds, trust companies, and government agencies. The 
trading mechanism in the overnight market is such that participants quote bid and ask 
prices for one-day loans, adjusting them slightly depending on whether they prefer to be 
lenders or borrowers. The brokers then post borrowing and lending rates and trades take 
place. Some trades are not arranged through brokers but directly between the overnight 
market participants. The Bank of Canada collects the information on ON rates and 
                                                 
2 A more detailed description of the MP implementation mechanism can be found in Howard (1998).  
Woodford (2001) also provides a technical description of the monetary policy implementation mechanism 
used by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, known as the channel system.   4 
publishes it daily on its website. One of the measures includes all overnight loans and is 
obtained through  direct communication with the overnight market participants.  It is 
referred to as the actual ON rate. The other measure uses broker transactions data (a 
subset of all overnight loans) and is  referred to as  the  Canadian overnight repo rate 
average (CORRA).  
 
3.  General Framework 
The role of each of the LVTS participants is to send and receive payments, mostly on 
behalf of their clients but also on their own behalf.
3 Their objective is to fulfill this role, 
that is, execute all their payment transactions, at the lowest possible cost and subject to 
the LVTS rules of operation. The costs can be broken down into intraday and end-of-day 
costs. Intraday costs are associated with borrowing activity in the overnight market and in 
the pre-settlement period. End-of-day cost is the direct or opportunity cost incurred at 
settlement, and it is calculated as the difference between the lending or remuneration rate 
offered by the Bank of Canada and the overnight rate. The intraday demand for liquidity 
and the associated costs arise owing to the enforcement of bilateral and multilateral credit 
limits in the LVTS. Payments system frictions in the form of asymmetric information 
create pressure on the overnight rate owing to the fact that participants’ projections of 
incoming payments and their timing are a lot less certain than their  knowledge of 
outgoing payments. Thus, despite the  fact that the  overnight market consists of both 
borrowers and lenders, increased payment flows result in upward pressure on ON rates.  
 
3.1  Intraday timing and information structure 
Early morning: LVTS participants begin each day knowing the target LVTS cash setting 
for the day, which is posted on the Bank’s website at the end of the preceding business 
day. The cash setting (CS) measures the amount of “excess” funds available in the LVTS. 
It is equal to the sum of the end-of-day (or pre-settlement period) net positions of the 14 
participants, excluding the Bank of Canada. The ON rate from the previous business day 
is also posted on the  Bank’s  website  at 9 a.m. each day.  In  addition to this public 
information,  LVTS participants  have some (albeit limited) knowledge of the  LVTS 
                                                 
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that close to 90 per cent of payments sent and received are on behalf of the 
clients.   5 
transactions for the day. They can observe the backlog of client orders that accumulated 
overnight while the LVTS was closed. Each client order is a request by the client to make 
a  payment on their behalf to another LVTS participant.  Client orders (or  outgoing 
payment requests) is private information and a source of payments system friction arising 
from information asymmetries.  As a result, information on the expected  incoming 
payments (other participants’ client orders) and their timing is  highly  uncertain, 
especially on days when there are large payment flows.
4 
  
  Late morning and afternoon: Participants will have sent all of their early morning 
payments. They will also fulfill any outgoing payments requests as well as receive some 
of the incoming payments sent to them. Based on the observed and forecast payment 
flows, they will decide how much to borrow/lend in the overnight market.  
 
  Late day (pre-settlement period) and closing: At the start of the pre-settlement 
period (6 p.m.), all incoming and outgoing client payments are completed and the net 
position  is known with certainty.  The p re-settlement period is then used to a rrange 
overnight loans, for the purpose of achieving a desired end-of-day balance. At closing 
(6:30 p.m.), participants with negative balances must take an advance at a penalty interest 
rate that is 25 basis points above the target, and those with a positive balance are paid 
interest on their balance at a rate of 25 basis points below the target. 
 
3.2  Participants’ cash-management behaviour 
In deciding how much to borrow earlier in the day in the overnight market versus late in 
the day, during the pre-settlement period, participants face a trade-off. Borrowing in the 
overnight market has the benefit of being less uncertain with respect to the ON interest 
rate charged (owing to the lack of a deep funds market late in the day
5), but there is more 
uncertainty r egarding the final end-of-day position and hence the amount of funds 
needed. On the other hand, borrowing late in the day, during the pre-settlement period, 
eliminates the end-of-day position uncertainty, since all incoming and outgoing payments 
                                                 
4 Furfine (2000) measures the magnitude of the end-of-day balance uncertainty as a linear function of the 
volume of payments (incoming + outgoing) transacted on that day. He claims that the two are positively 
related because  the probability of  operational glitches, bookkeeping mistakes, or simply the failure of 
payments to arrive before the end of the day is positively related to the volume of payments transacted. 
5 The evidence in the Canadian case is mostly anecdotal, owing to the lack of transactions-level data.     6 
have been realized, but interest rate uncertainty increases owing to the limited number of 
participants, imperfect information regarding their net balances, and higher transactions 
costs associated with matching lenders and borrowers. 
 
  Participants’ expectations on the conditions for lending and borrowing during the 
pre-settlement period are also largely affected by the amount of the cash-setting target 
(known a day in advance). When the cash setting is low or 0, transactions costs may 
increase, since each participant will hold a relatively smaller positive position, which may 
be insufficient to cover the negative position of another participant. Since participants 
lack information on the net positions of others, search costs are higher. Alternatively, 
even if a single participant has exactly the offsetting surplus balance, it may not be able 
to lend all these funds, because the amount may exceed its internal credit exposure limit 
towards the other participant. 
 
  Accordingly, the demand for overnight funds, and hence  the ON rate, will 
increase on the days when there are large (morning) payment flows. This will happen 
because each participant will increase their expected borrowing amount, and because the 
uncertainty  increases  with respect to the incoming payments. The O N rate will also 
increase  when the cash setting is relatively low, because much of the demand for 
overnight funds will be shifted to the overnight market. Section 5 empirically tests this 
hypothesis.  
 
4.  Data  
I use daily data spanning the period from February 1999, when the LVTS was introduced, 
to December 2004. There are a total of 1490 observations. The sample is split into two 
periods to reflect different approaches by the Bank of Canada in its cash-setting policy. 
The earlier period was one of introduction and adjustment as the Bank of Canada and the 
LVTS participants adapted to the new system. The  current regime was  formally 
implemented on 3 April 2001. Summaries of descriptive statistics for the variables of 
interest are provided in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
   7 
Table 1: Daily Descriptive Statistics- Period I 
04 Feb/99- 03 Apr/01 
(N = 544) 
  Mean  Median  Std.Dev. 
Cash Setting Target (millions $)  153.0  0  242.4 
DEV_ON (basis points) 
= target ON rate – actual ON rate  -2.82  0  5.41 
DEV_CORRA (basis points)  
= target ON rate – CORRA rate  -4.63  -2.28  6.84 
Volume of payments sent  13,577  13,275  2,108 
 
Correlation (DEV_ON, DEV_ CORRA) = 0.95 
 
Table 2: Daily Descriptive Statistics- Period II  
03Apr/01- 31Dec/04 
(N = 940) 
  Mean  Median  Std.Dev. 
Cash Setting Target (millions $)  98.5  50  132.4 
DEV_ON (basis points) 
= target ON rate – actual ON rate  0.50  0.43  0.49 
DEV_CORRA (basis points)  
= target ON rate – CORRA rate  -0.73  -0.6  1.23 
Volume of payments sent  15,912  15,595  2,551 
 
Correlation (DEV_ON , DEV_ CORRA) = 0.14 
 
4.1  Cash setting  
When the LVTS was  first implemented  on  4  February 1999, the cash setting was 
implicitly set at zero. However, it became apparent in subsequent months that the system 
was  not  working as intended, and so, starting in September  1999, the B ank began 
experimenting with non-zero (surplus) cash settings on certain days when higher payment 
volumes and uncertainties were expected to affect the ON market.  These non-zero 
settings typically occurred at the beginning and end of each month. Consultations with 
LVTS participants also eventually led to experimentation with modest non-zero target 
cash settings on all business days, not just those expected to be unusually tight. Under the 
current regime, in place officially since April 2001, the minimum target cash setting is 
$50 million, with larger amounts of up to several hundred million around the beginning   8 
and end of each month. The adoption of the current regime is assumed to have caused a 
break in the data.  Consequently, I  d ivide the  sample into two  periods. The  large 
differences  between the mean and standard deviations of the two  periods are  also 
indicative of a break in the series.  
 
  On some days, the actual cash setting will differ from the target cash setting.
6 In 
general, overshooting and undershooting the  targeted cash-setting amount was much 
more frequent in the first period than in the second period. In the first period, the actual 
cash setting was below the targeted amount more often than above it. This pattern was 
reversed in the second period, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Actual vs. Target Cash Setting 
  04 Feb /99- 03 Apr/01  03 Apr/01- 31 Dec/04 
  No. Days  % Days  No. Days  % Days 
CS actual > CS target  21   3.8  38   4.0 
CS actual < CS target  34   6.2  9   0.95 
 
 
4.2  Measures of the overnight interest rate 
The target ON rate is the Bank of Canada’s key policy rate. Throughout the year, there 
are eight predetermined dates (fixed announcement days or FADs) when the Bank of 
Canada announces the level of the target ON interest rate. Each decision is announced by 
9 a.m. on the day of the FAD via a press release. The target rate is also published on the 
Bank’s website. 
 
  The ON money market financing rate is “the Bank of Canada estimate for the rate 
at which major dealers are able to arrange financing of securities inventory for a term of 
one business day.”
7  The reported rate is  based on data provided  by primary dealers. 
Hereafter, I refer to the overnight money market financing rate as the (actual) ON rate. 
This rate is available daily on the Bank of Canada website at 9 a.m. for the previous 
business day. Another measure of the conditions in the overnight market is provided by 
                                                 
6 Generally, the actual will be less than the target if there are uncovered Receiver General balances in the 
P.M. auction, and it will be greater than target on days when the Bank intervenes by injecting large 
amounts of liquidity in the market (via SPRAs). 
7 < http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/monmrt.htm >.   9 
the Canadian overnight repo rate average (CORRA). This rate is based on the general 
collateral (consisting of Government of Canada T-bills and bonds) traded through and 
reported by Freedom International Brokerage Inc., Prebon Yamane (Canada) Ltd., and 
Shorcan Brokers Ltd.
8 It is also available on the Bank of Canada’s website. Figure A1 in 
the appendix plots the deviations from the target rate for both measures of the overnight 
rate. 
 
4.3  The behaviour of the ON rate(s) 
Both the ON rate and CORRA are indicators of the overnight market conditions. When 
the overnight market conditions are “tight” (i.e., there is a greater than usual demand for 
liquidity), the ON rate as well as CORRA are expected to be higher. Likewise, at times of 
abundant liquidity, the ON rate and CORRA are expected to be lower. The magnitude 
and the sign of the deviations from the target are an indication of the degree and the 
direction of the pressure on the ON rate. If both rates are equally good at measuring these 
conditions, then the rates would be expected to be highly correlated. The full sample 
correlation between these series is nearly perfect, at 0.94. However, this observation is 
invalidated by calculating correlations separately in each period. In the period between 
February 1999 and April 2001 the correlation (0.95) is very close to that of the whole 
sample (0.94). However, since April 2001 the two rates are completely uncorrelated. The 
correlation coefficient drops from 0.95 to 0.14. The full sample correlation is dominated 
by the first subsample, even though it is the smaller of the two, because both series are 
more volatile in the first-period sample.  The differences in the means and standard 
deviations of the two periods are quite substantial. In the period between February 1999 
and April 2001, the ON rate was on average 2.8 basis points above the target. In the 
second period, the mean ON rate was 0.5 basis points below the target. CORRA has 
remained above the target ON rate in both periods, but the average deviation has dropped 
from 4.6 basis points to 0.73 basis points in the second period. CORRA is more volatile 
than the actual ON rate in both periods, possibly due to a smaller number of transactions 
(only those going through one of the three brokers) that are used in its calculation. 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid.   10 
  The large deviations of both rates in the first period can partially be attributed to 
the uncertainty associated with the changes to the level of the target ON rate and more 
volatility in the level of the cash setting  during this period.  Additionally, p rior to 
November 2000, interest rate changes were announced at irregular intervals. With the 
introduction of  fixed announcement dates (FADs) in November 2000, the uncertainty 
associated with the timing of target ON rate changes has been greatly reduced.
9 This may 
have further contributed to the disparity in the behaviour of the ON rate and CORRA in 
period I versus period II.  
 
4.4  Payment volumes  
The average volume (number) of payments sent per day, excluding those sent by the 
Bank of Canada, has been growing every year since the first year of LVTS operation (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Within a given year, payment volumes increase from month to month. 
Generally, the average volume of payments tends to be the highest in December and the 
lowest in January. The monthly average volume has been increasing on a year-over-year 
basis as well.  
 
4.5  SPRAs and SRAs 
Special purchase and resale agreements (SPRAs) are repo-type transactions in which the 
Bank of Canada offers to purchase Government of Canada securities from primary 
dealers with an agreement to sell them back at a predetermined price the next business 
day. In this way, SPRAs enable the Bank to inject additional liquidity in the system when 
the ON rate exceeds the target by larger than what is considered an acceptable amount in 
order to reduce this deviation.  
 
  Sale and repurchase agreements (SRAs) are reverse repo-type transactions in 
which the Bank of Canada offers to sell Government of Canada securities to primary 
dealers with an agreement to buy them back at a predetermined price the next business 
day. The Bank thus removes excess liquidity from the system. SRAs are conducted on 
those days when the ON rate is trading sufficiently below the target ON rate.  
                                                 
9 However, the Bank may still announce target overnight interest rate changes outside of the regular FADs, 
as was done in the days following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.   11 
 
  The decision regarding whether to use SPRAs or SRAs is typically made each day 
at 11:45 a.m.  based on the conditions in the overnight market as reported by major 
dealers through telephone conversations with Bank of Canada staff. Both SPRAs and 
SRAs are transacted at the target ON rate and therefore act as ON rate anchors.  
 
  SPRAs are more frequently used than SRAs in both periods (see Table 4). In the 
latter period, there is a large decrease in the frequency of SPRA use, but the mean and 
median value of the SPRA amount does not change significantly. SRAs are almost never 
used in the second period.  
 
Table 4: SPRAs and SRAs 
  04 Feb/99- 03 Apr/01 
(N = 544) 
04 Apr/01-31 Dec/04  
(N = 940) 
  Volume  Value  
Mean/ Median  
(millions $) 
% Days  Volume  Value  
Mean/ Median  
(millions $) 
% Days 
SPRAs  328  477/ 498  60.0  32  507/ 453  3.4 
SRAs  42  554/ 475  7.7  2  433/ 433  0.21 
 
 
5.  Estimation and Results  
5.1  Estimation 
Based on the model described in section 3, the following equation is estimated:  
DEV_ONt = ß0 +  ß1 DEV_ONt-1 + ß2 DEV_VOLt  + ß3 CSDt  + ß3 INTt  + et 
 
where 
   
ON_Rt*  is the ON rate target 
 
ON_Rt   is the actual ON rate (money market financing rate) 
   12 
DEV_ONt  = ON_Rt* - ON_Rt  
measures the overnight interest rate deviation from the target, 
expressed in basis points. A negative value indicates that the ON rate 
is above the target rate and that the overnight market conditions are 
“tight.” DEV_ONt is positive when the ON rate is below the target 
rate.  
 
VOLt   is the volume of payments sent during the day excluding those sent by 
the Bank of Canada. This is an approximation of the client orders. 
Although the majority of payments sent are customer payments, other 
types of transactions (interbank payments, foreign exchange swaps, 
etc.) are also included in the daily volume measure.  
 
AVG_VOLt   is the one-month, or 22 business days, moving-average volume of 
sent payments. 
 
DEV_VOLt  = VOLt  - AVG_VOLt  
is a measure of the volume of payments sent on day t relative to the 
past 22 days’ average.  DEV_VOLt is negative on the days when 
payment flow volume is low and positive on particularly busy days of 
the month. DEV_VOLt is our best approximation for the borrowing 
activity that would be observed in the overnight market.  
 
CSDt  is the cash-setting dummy variable, which takes on the value of 1 
whenever the cash setting is greater than the “average day” amount. 
Thus, in the period between 15 November and 5 December 2000, this 
amount is 200 million and for the rest of the sample the “average day” 
amount is considered to be 50 million. The cash-setting amount is set 
and announced a day in advance (and therefore is not affected by the 
actual payment flows for that day). 
 
INTt  is the probability of intervention (through the use of SPRAs) by the 
Bank of Canada. See below for the methodology used to estimate this 
variable. 
 
5.2  Bank of Canada intervention estimation 
Since SRAs were used rather infrequently (see section 4), the focus  is on the use of 
SPRAs as an intervention instrument. The SPRA dummy takes on a value of 1 on those 
days when SPRAs were conducted, and 0 otherwise. In order to avoid the endogeneity 
problems associated with  directly  including the SPRA dummy variable in the above 
equation, the probability of intervention is estimated using a probit estimation of the 
following form:   13 
SPRAt = ß0 +  ß1 DEV_ONt-1 + ß2 DEV_VOLt  + ß3 ERt-1 + et . 
 
  Here, ER denotes the Canada-U.S. bilateral exchange rate. All other variables are 
defined as before. ER serves as a proxy for market conditions and therefore affects the 
Bank of Canada’s likelihood of market intervention. The coefficient estimates from the 
probit equation are used to estimate the probability of the Bank of Canada intervention, 
the  INT variable.  The coefficient values and the associated statistics are provided in 
Table 5.   
 
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimation of Intervention with SPRAs  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  P-value   
PERIOD I: 05Mar/99 – 03Apr/01 
C  14.47  3.21  0 
ERt-1  -9.77  2.15  0 
DEV_VOLt  9.76E-05  3.36E-05  3.6E-03 
DEV_ONt-1  -0.13  0.014  0 
PERIOD II: 04Apr/01- 31Dec/04 
C  -3.97  1.28  0.002 
ERt-1  1.17  0.887  0.188 
DEV_VOLt  2.44E-04  3.75E-05  0 
DEV_ONt-1  0.3  0.198  0.131 
Predictability Power (cutoff probability =0.5) 
  SPRA = 0   SPRA = 1 
PERIOD I: 05Mar/99 – 03Apr/01 
% Correct  72.27  73.6 
% Incorrect  27.73  26.4 
PERIOD II: 04Apr/01- 31Dec/04 
% Correct  100  0 
% Incorrect  0  100 
 
 
5.3  Structural break  
The change in the cash-setting regime documented in the previous section occurred on 
3 April 2001. I conduct a structural breakpoint test of an unknown breakpoint date that 
falls within a specific interval, as in Andrews (1993). This procedure involves conducting 
a Chow breakpoint test for every date within a specified interval and choosing the one 
with the highest F-statistic value. I define this interval to be between 2 November 1999 
and 31 May 2001 because of a significant change in the volatility and the mean of the ON   14 
rate deviations during this period. The F-statistic is plotted in Figure A2 in the appendix. 
The peak value (F-statistic = 73) is found to be on 12 and 15 November 1999, which 
corresponds with an announcement of a cash-setting target of 200 million dollars on an 
“average day” and its subsequent implementation on 15 November.
10  
 
5.4  Results  
Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests indicate that there are no unit roots in any of the series. The 
regressions  are estimated  by ordinary least squares (OLS) using Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) standard error and covariance corrections. 
The subsequent  analysis and estimation  are  done using  the two  identified  structural 
breakpoint dates,  15  November 1999 and  3  April 2001, producing three separate 
regressions. The original Period I is now broken into two subperiods. Estimation using 
intervention probability is not done for the  4  April 2001–31  December 2004 period, 
because of its poor predictability power and the very infrequent interventions during this 
time (see Table 5). Regression results are shown in Table 6.  
 

































INTt  -6.46** 
(3.28) 
-7.42E-01 
(5.20E-01)  N/A 
R
2 adjusted  0.56  0.53  0.14 
S.E. Regression  3.75  1.23  0.46 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*= significant at 10%, **= significant at 5%, ***= significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Merrett (1999).   15 
  In all three regressions, the payment flow coefficient has the correct sign and is 
statistically significant. This result agrees with the theoretical model, which suggests that 
higher payment  flow creates upward pressure on the ON rate because of LVTS 
participants’ increased demand for overnight funds. For example, in the earliest period, 
an increase of 1,000 payments above the 22-day moving-average volume increases the 
ON rate by 1 basis point. The coefficient gradually diminishes in magnitude, as do the 
overnight rate deviations, but it remains statistically significant. Thus, the impact of an 
increase or decrease in the payment flows remains an important factor in determining the 
pressure on the overnight rate. In the most recent period, an increase of 1,000 payments 
above the 22-day moving-average volume increases the ON rate by a negligible 0.0192 
basis points.  
 
  The cash-setting dummy is significant in the first regression. During this period, 
whenever there was an increase in the cash setting above the “average amount,” the 
overnight rate dropped below the target rate (by about 4 percentage points). Increasing 
the cash-setting amount relieved some of the upward pressure on the ON rate as predicted 
by  the  hypothesis. In the  subsequent periods, the participants  observed that the cash 
setting would be adjusted according to the market conditions, so its  effect  on  the 
overnight rate disappeared (i.e., the coefficient is not significant) and the overnight rate 
deviations became smaller. These results illustrate the improvements in the efficiency of 
MP implementation under a changed cash-setting regime. Similarly, the INT coefficient 
is insignificant in the second period regression, since SPRAs became more effective in 
bringing the overnight rate closer to the target. 
 
  Results obtained using CORRA  as an overnight rate measure confirm that the 
payment flow  coefficient decreases in magnitude over time but remains statistically 
significant even in the latest period.  These  estimates can be found in the appendix, 
Table A1.  
   16 
6.  Conclusion 
One of the main roles and responsibilities of the Bank of Canada is that of conducting 
and implementing monetary policy. The key monetary policy rate is the overnight interest 
rate (ON).  The efficiency of  monetary policy implementation can be assessed by 
measuring how well the ON rate tracks the target ON rate. In this paper, I assess the 
effect that changes in the daily LVTS payment flows have on the behaviour of the ON 
rate relative to the target ON rate.  
 
  There has been a large difference in the behaviour of the ON rate relative to its 
target (and therefore of the efficiency of monetary policy implementation) over time. In 
particular, the period between February 1999 and April 2001 can be characterized as one 
of learning and adjustment, for both the Bank of Canada and the LVTS participants. The 
target cash settings, initially always zero, were subsequently subject to large and frequent 
changes. This period was characterized by less precision in attaining the targeted cash 
settings, frequent interventions in the overnight market by the Bank of Canada, and large 
and volatile  ON  rate deviations.  Since April 2001, there has been a substantial 
improvement in attaining the targeted cash setting along with a more established pattern 
of cash-setting amounts, a much better record of achieving the target ON rate, as well as 
fewer Bank of Canada interventions in the overnight market. Nonetheless, I find that 
LVTS payment flows  are  always  an important determinant of the pressure on the 
overnight interest rate.  That is, a n increase in  the  payment volume creates upward 
pressure on the ON rate. I therefore conclude that payments system frictions have the 
potential to  impede the efficiency of monetary policy implementation but that the 
effective use of cash setting policy can be used to mitigate this effect.  
 
  Further research will focus on participant’s early morning net positions and/or the 
volume and value of sent payments in relation to the ON rate pressures. This will provide 
further insights into the differences in participants’ payment activity and their impact on 
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Period I: Feb1999- April 2001 
Period II: April 2001- Dec 2004 
Mean = -2.82 Std.Dev= 5.41 
Mean = 0.5 Std.Dev= 0.5 
DEV_ON = ON* - ON 
(continued) 






























































Period I: Feb 1999- April 2001 
Period II: April 2001- Dec 2004   20 







































INTt  -9.89** 
(4.16) 
-1.74*** 
(6.80E-01)  N/A 
R
2 adjusted  0.47  0.43  0.082 
S.E. Regression  5.34  2.23  1.19 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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